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ASSISTING HOST NATIONS IN DEVELOPING HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with.) -General George A. Joulwan, USA Commander, US European Command 21 October 1993 -10 July 1997
The United States (US) has a long history of providing health support to foreign nations, and it does so in various forms. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts While noble in their intent, "the vast majority of these military medical humanitarian assistance projects involve providing direct patient care services, often for very short periods of time, leaving the problems in medical and public health infrastructure unresolved and unfortunately often unaddressed." 2 Poor or devastated countries with minimal health infrastructure cannot provide the same quality of care offered by US personnel once they depart. 3 However, currently it is not the DOD's mission to lead the construction or reconstruction efforts of these nations in crisis.
The US Department of State's (DOS) Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has as its core mission to "lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict situations and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy." 4 The DOS is under-resourced both in manpower and budget to accomplish this mission effectively. In the President's 2010 Budget, the funding for the S/CRS "requests $323.3 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) to build our nation's civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization efforts" to beneficiary population of 9.6 million service members, veterans, and family members. 8 In order to be more effective trainers and mentors to foreign medical professionals in establishing or improving their own health care systems, DOD medical personnel need also to be familiar with the lessons learned from our own past experiences in building health care systems and learn about and develop a better understanding of how other nations practice medicine. We need to provide foreign nations assistance on how to best administer their medicine to their people, not simply establish a carbon-copy of the US health system on a non-US society.
RAND examined historical cases from post-World War II Japan, the conflict in Kosovo at the turn of this century, and Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively on the post-conflict reconstruction of the respective nations' health care systems. Japan's successful reconstruction of its health care system was accomplished by system-wide reforms in disease prevention, reorganization of their hospital system, and reforms in medical education. This success was in part due to the ability of US military medical personnel operating in a secure and safe environment. 9 Also, there was no armed insurgency targeting the civilian population like that seen in the stability and reconstruction phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Not a single member of the occupying forces was killed by Japanese citizens nor were the Japanese victims of American attacks. 10 Issues of security were quickly turned over to Japanese police, allowing the occupation authorities to concentrate on political and social reform, economic restructuring, reconstruction, and development. 11 The physician in charge of overseeing the rebuilding of Japan's health care system, COL (Dr.) Crawford F. Sams, argued that reconstructing the Japanese health system "did more than perhaps any other single action to prove that the United States was committed to building a vibrant, functioning democracy out of a former enemy state." Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), under which fell the Department of Health. 13 The
Department of Health chose to both reform the health system that existed prior to the conflict while it simultaneously undertook a major reconstruction effort. 14 The previously existing health care system, during the socialist days when Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia, was expansive, centralized, treatment-, hospital-, and doctor-oriented.
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There was a network of one university hospital, five district hospitals, thirty municipal health clinics providing secondary care services, and multiple smaller clinics providing primary health care (PHC), which was very inefficient.
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The Ministry of Health (MOH) implemented several changes to evolve from a hospital-based system to a PHC, patient-centered system. It decentralized day-to-day management of clinics and health facilities to the district and local levels, and promoted the family medicine model which serves as the gatekeeper for referral to secondary and tertiary care. 17 The Kosovo MOH opened 24-hour family health clinics that provide preventive medical, dental, diagnostic and emergency care. Priority was given to maternal, child, adolescent, and reproductive health. 18 The UNMIK sent medical leaders abroad to train in health care management or, in conjunction with private donors, organized training courses in Kosovo.
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The success of these reforms are mixed, due to a combination of the speed and complexity of the required reforms, decrease in post-war donor financial support, and decrease in MOH's budget. 20 Successes include the streamlining of the health care system from the local health clinics to the major university hospital in Pristina, the refurbishing and reequipping of health facilities, and improvement of the clinics and hospitals administration. 21 Improvements are still needed for better procurement systems and financial and human capital management. Doctors are also gravitating towards more lucrative clinical specialties and private practices, decreasing the number of physicians available to see patients in national-sponsored facilities. Finally, some municipal PHC positions are awarded as political favors.
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Iraq is another example of a mixed success. Although back on progress now, the reconstruction of the Iraq health care system suffered as a result of the insurgency that occurred during the stability and reconstruction phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Hospitals were targeted by the insurgents 23 , as were physicians and other health care workers. 24 Since most of the doctors training is done in English, many were hired on by the US government to serve as interpreters, taking them away from practicing medicine. By 2008, "at least 600 medical professionals, including 134 doctors have been killed or threatened." 25 The result was a shortage of health care providers as many health care workers fled the country or relocated to safer regions within the country working in less dangerous trades. 26 This was further complicated by slow progress in reliability of water, sanitation, and electricity, and multiple ministers of health that prevented long term coordination of planning and funding. 27 Even with this positive trend, it will still take years to replenish the health care workforce to pre-2003 levels. 28 Afghanistan is an example of a failed heath system construction. Since the 1950's, Afghanistan has been dependent on external support for its health system. 29 After Operation ENDURING FREEDOM began in October of 2001, the development of the nation's health system was slow to start; it was not until the beginning of the third year of the war that health services were expanded to the rural areas. 30 As of April 2009, few trained doctors and midwives provide obstetric care in rural areas where 75%
of the female population lives. 31 Deficiencies in the rebuilding of their health system included inadequate funding and ineffective communication and coordination among the international and non-governmental organizations and with the Afghan government. 32 A US GAO report found that USAID's program in Afghanistan lacked measurable goals and specific resource levels, did not delineate responsibilities, contained no plans for evaluation of their program, and also cited poor collaboration and information sharing among all participating agencies. 33 These case studies illustrate several lessons in which the development of health care delivery systems in support of nation building can be improved upon: (1) health care delivery and subsequent improvement in health of a population can help win hearts-and-minds and have an independent effect on nation building efforts, (2) health system development or reconstruction must include effective planning, coordination, and leadership, (3) health reform is linked to other areas such as power, transportation, and governance, (4) health reform must be sustainable with responsibility passed to the host-nation's health care providers and leaders, and (5) security is a requirement for all reconstruction including health care. 34 Unless the other civilian organizations within the US government receive significant increases in funding and personnel, the DOD will remain the largest, best funded, and better organized US organization that can efficiently orchestrate the improvement of health care systems in support of nation building.
Stability Operations are a Core US Military Mission
There are multiple strategic documents that address the importance of DOD support to stability and reconstruction operations. 39 These forces used their medical assets to provide short-term assistance in order to help pacify the local population. 40 The US saw an opportunity to use limited military medical aid to governments friendly to the US, who were engaged in their own low intensity conflicts, as one way to help win the hearts-and-minds of the local population. planning, training and education, and long-term operational capacity." 62 These are longterm projects that historically the DOD has not taken the lead on. The US military and DOS must interact with the humanitarian organizations collaboratively to enable the best outcome for the affected population, because these organizations will improve the public health sector by strengthening the local and national health systems and other public health capacity-building activities. 63 They also free the US military from using more of their resources to provide health care to affected populations. NGOs frequently are reluctant to work directly with the military, fearing they might appear to potentially compromise their impartiality and neutrality. In Afghanistan for example, NGO decisions regarding the recipients, type, and quantity, of aid are based solely on the organization's independent assessment of needs without discrimination and without promoting a particular political agenda or outcome. 65 If there is not close coordination with civilian organizations operating in the locality, short-term efforts by the US military may compete with or interfere with long-term goals of the civilian organizations as well as threaten their impartiality. 66 The organizational structure of the coordinating body differs depending on the situation. During disaster responses and humanitarian assistance operations a governmental agency other than the Department of Defense (DOD) serves as the lead agency, with the DOD serving as a supporting agency. 67 During stability operations, the military enables complimentary efforts of local and international aid organizations to stabilize the public health situation within the commander's operational area, including strengthening the local and national health systems and other public health capacitybuilding activities. 68 Achieving measurable progress requires coordination and constant dialogue among all parties involved, eventually transitioning from military-led efforts to civilian organizations or the host nation. 69 The chief medical officer of the task force will, through the task force commander, 73 This resulted in decentralized and uncoordinated processes for planning and execution among the many agencies and units in Afghanistan; this approach is unsustainable over the long-term. 74 The medical efforts of the joint and combined military forces must be equipping, and supplying hospitals, clinics, and on medical education programs. 95 Yet visits to some of these facilities show they are not operating as advertised, furthering the perception that the national government is failing the population. 96 A recommended solution by the Center of Technology and National Security Policy at National Defense
University is the creation of a health sector reconstruction office in the Afghan national government, with the DOD serving as a significant partner along with personnel from USAID, experts from the Department of Health and Human Services, the USDA, IOs, PVOs, NGOs, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and academia. 97 The office would develop health care delivery projects, set priorities, and integrate and unify nationwide planning and integration with the government of Afghanistan, representatives of other nations, and the multiple humanitarian organizations. 98 Similar to the proposed CJTF/JMC2E-Surgeon cell, this office would have the coordinating authority with all health service activities in country, including the DOD projects with the ANA and ANP, and with ISAF. 99 As the security situation in Afghanistan is still being stabilized, the DOD should be the organization initially responsible for leading this effort, and should be resourced appropriately along with the required authorities. 100 This will ensure that as the Taliban and insurgents are defeated across the nation, efficient development of local reconstruction projects can begin that will be synchronized with a national strategy of developing a nationwide health care system. In two of the geographic combatant commands, US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the staffs have been restructured to embed expertise from multiple civilian departments to enhance coordination among interagency partners. 101 This has greatly improved the integration of civilian expertise, into the process of planning operations and increases the coordination and synchronization of efforts within the multiple US government agencies. 102 Civilian humanitarian organizations may be more amenable to working with such an health sector coordination office if the leader is a civilian DOD member as opposed to a uniformed leader. and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality and empower women, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, (7) ensure environmental sustainability, and (8) develop a global partnership for development." 108 US military medical personnel should be experts in these three international framing documents and declarations in order to ensure the best interaction and synchronization with the NGO, PVO, and IO partners and host nation medical leaders. This will enable DOD medical advisors to better attain unity of effort among all stakeholders as the help guide strategic planning for host nation health care systems.
Conclusion
"The condition of infrastructure is often a barometer of whether a society will slip further into violence or make a peaceful transition out of the conflict cycle." 109 The development, reconstruction, or rehabilitation of the health care delivery system of postconflict nations is an important part of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. Health care clinical and administrative personnel have the expertise in operating one of the largest health care systems in the world, the US military health care system. While it is the responsibility of other organizations within the US government to assist other nations in developing and improving their health care delivery systems, because they have not only the technical expertise but the requisite cultural knowledge and sensitivities, these organizations are not staffed, resourced, and funded to fully execute this task. The DOD has the deployable personnel, resources, and technical expertise, both civilian and military, to better advise post-conflict governments on improving their health care systems. This will involve better partnerships with civilian humanitarian organizations to achieve an economy of scale in these efforts. Finally, strategic communications to the local population, allied and enemy populations, and the leaders of the host nation and the humanitarian organizations will be key to pushing messages that the DOD's efforts are to impartially assist in the host nation government in the successful reconstruction of a sustainable, efficient health care delivery system that will benefit the entire population of the postconflict nation. 
